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Poor insight into illness is considered the primary cause of 
treatment noncompliance in schizophrenia. In this article, 
we critically discuss the predominant conceptual accounts 
of poor insight, which consider it as an ineffective self-reflec-
tion, caused either by psychological defenses or impaired 
metacognition. We argue that these accounts are at odds 
with the phenomenology of schizophrenia, and we propose 
a novel account of poor insight. We suggest that the reason 
why schizophrenia patients have no or only partial insight 
and consequently do not comply with treatment is rooted 
in the nature of their anomalous self-experiences (ie, self- 
disorders) and the related articulation of their psychotic 
symptoms. We argue that self-disorders destabilize the 
patients’ experiential framework, thereby weakening their 
basic sense of reality (natural attitude) and enabling another 
sense of reality (solipsistic attitude) to emerge and coexist. 
This coexistence of attitudes, which Bleuler termed “double 
bookkeeping,” is, in our view, central to understanding what 
poor insight in schizophrenia really is. We suggest that our 
phenomenologically informed account of poor insight may 
have important implications for early intervention, psycho-
education, and psychotherapy for schizophrenia.
Key words: compliance/phenomenology/double  
bookkeeping/vulnerability
Introduction
A major problem in the treatment of  schizophrenia is 
the patients’ reluctance to accept and adhere to con-
tinuous antipsychotic medication. The estimates of 
noncompliance rates in patients with schizophrenia 
range from 50%–75% after 1–2  years of  treatment,1,2 
impeding treatment and increasing the risk of  relapse, 
readmission, and suicide 3- to 4-fold.3,4
It is widely assumed that in order to modify the non-
compliant attitude, we must attain a better understanding 
of the causes behind this attitude. Some of the well-
known causes are pharmacological side effects, mistrust 
of the clinician, stigma of diagnosis, and positive atti-
tudes toward positive symptoms.5 Yet, the primary cause 
of medication noncompliance is generally considered to 
be poor insight into illness.1 According to Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder-Fourth Edition-
Text Revision, “Evidence suggests that poor insight is a 
manifestation of the illness itself  [schizophrenia] rather 
than a coping strategy.”6 Empirical studies have estimated 
that 50%–80% of patients with schizophrenia have poor 
insight into illness.7,8
During the last 25 years, there has been a growth of 
publications on awareness of  illness in schizophrenia, 
which has resulted in multiple psychometric instru-
ments of  varying complexity and sophistication.9–11 The 
current medical definition of  insight into illness is mul-
tidimensional, comprising awareness of  having a men-
tal disorder, of  its symptoms and signs, of  the need for 
treatment, and of  the disorder’s social consequences.12 
Poor insight reflects a decrease or lack of  awareness on 
some or all of  these dimensions.
Most studies have found that insight into illness predicts 
treatment compliance and better clinical and functional 
outcome.1,9,13 Researchers have tried to reach a more pro-
found understanding of poor insight, typically by exploring 
its correlations with other clinical and sociodemographic 
variables such as symptomatology, prognosis, age of onset 
of the disorder, cognitive impairment, global and social 
functioning, clinical outcome, gender, and educational 
level—but the studies have yielded conflicting results with 
little pragmatic utility.14 Poor insight has also been explored 
in relation to structural and functional neuroimaging, but 
the results are inconsistent and no general conclusion 
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can yet be drawn.15 One meta-analysis16 found a small 
negative correlation between insight and global, positive, 
and negative symptoms, and a small positive correlation 
between insight and depressive symptoms; 3%–7% of the 
variance in insight was accounted for by the severity of 
symptomatology.
Given the importance of insight in treatment, psy-
choeducation aiming at increasing patients’ awareness 
of their illness has become a widely adopted interven-
tion for schizophrenia. However, a comprehensive meta-
analysis17 concluded that psychoeducational attempts to 
increase insight and thereby improve medication compli-
ance had failed. These disappointing results should serve 
as a wake-up call: we must acknowledge that in spite of 
decades of research on insight and on psychoeducational 
interventions, there has been no significant advance in the 
treatment of patients who are noncompliant due to poor 
insight. We see this failure as a result of an inadequate 
understanding of the nature of poor insight in schizo-
phrenia. Moreover, we believe that additional correla-
tions between measures of insight and ever new variables 
are not likely to break new ground in research or treat-
ment. Rather, we propose to ask anew the fundamental 
questions: What is poor insight in schizophrenia? Why 
do many schizophrenia patients despite multiple relapses 
and readmissions not feel ill in the sense of attributing 
their abnormal experiences to this mental disorder?
In the following, we will critically discuss the dominant 
conceptual accounts of poor insight. We will then briefly 
sketch the notion of disordered self  in schizophrenia spec-
trum disorders. With the help of the notion of self-disor-
der, we will propose a novel account of poor insight and 
noncompliance in schizophrenia. This is a phenomeno-
logically oriented account, based on empirical data and 
in-depth clinical examination of the patients’ experiences.
Conceptual Accounts of Poor Insight
Two accounts of poor insight monopolize the debate. 
The classical account, with psychoanalytic roots, associ-
ates poor insight with a defense mechanism, ie, a denial of 
being ill with the purpose shielding the person from a situa-
tion with which she cannot yet cope. On this account, poor 
insight (sometimes referred to, in other conceptualizations, 
as “sealing over,” “evasion,” “indifference reaction,” or 
“external attributions”) is a coping strategy that protects 
the person and possibly wards off depressive symptoms 
arising from awareness of having a chronic mental illness.16 
The account from cognitive neuroscience suggests that 
poor insight is a “failure of metacognition” that is caused 
by deficits in the dorsomedial frontal cortex: the patients 
lack an ability to accurately reflect on their mental con-
tents (“a failure of strategic metacognition”) or are victims 
of a systematic bias in the appraisal of the mental con-
tent (“a failure of attributive metacognition”).15 However, 
there is no conclusive evidence about the specificity of the 
postulated impaired metacognitions nor about their link to 
poor insight.15 On this account, poor insight is sometimes 
compared with specific neurological conditions with simi-
larities or even equivalence to anosognosia.
These accounts of poor insight are, in our view, quite 
problematic. The first problem facing both accounts is 
that they conceptualize the issue of poor insight in schizo-
phrenia as a simple and straightforward problem of self-
reflection. Insight is just an act of critical reflection on 
one’s own psychological life. The reflecting self  somehow 
notices an error in the reflected, on-going subjective life, 
which then may become rationally corrected. In schizo-
phrenia, it is claimed, this self-reflection fails, either due 
to interfering subconscious psychological defenses or 
because of metacognitive deficits. Second, and even more 
importantly, both accounts implicitly assume that insofar 
as these “problems” (defense or failures of metacogni-
tion) were remedied, the patients would acquire insight 
into their medical condition—ie, they assume that, fol-
lowing the standard medical model, the ways in which 
the patients experience themselves, others, and the world 
essentially remain unaffected by the illness and that the 
problem of insight, in the vocabulary from cognitive psy-
chology, results from specific errors in the information 
processing of their experiences. In other words, the medi-
cal model and the conceptual accounts presuppose a neat 
distinction between the symptoms of the illness and the 
unaffected self. However, this presupposition is highly 
questionable, if  we take seriously the claim that schizo-
phrenia is a specific disorder of the self, which involves 
a variety of alterations of the structures of experiencing, 
affecting the very conditions of  self-reflection.18–23
The Disordered Self in Schizophrenia
The notion of disordered self  as the core disturbance of 
schizophrenia appears in all foundational texts on schizo-
phrenia (eg, Kraepelin, Bleuler, Minkowski, Jaspers, and 
Schneider) but was only recently revived in contemporary 
psychiatry.18–24 The experience of being a self, which is what 
here is at stake, signifies that we live our (conscious) life in 
the first-person perspective, as a self-present, single, tem-
porally persistent, bodily, and bounded subject of expe-
rience. Phenomenology25 and neuroscience26 operate with 
the notion of “minimal” or “core” self  to define a formal 
structure of experience that necessarily must be in place 
in order for us to have any experiences at all. The minimal 
self  refers to the first-personal articulation of experience, 
typically called “mineness,” “myness,” “for-me-ness” or 
ipseity.27 It is a sense of “I-me-myself” that implicitly (pre-
reflectively) permeates our experiences across the flux of 
time and changing modalities of conscious life. Ipseity is a 
condition of the so-called radical self-identification, which 
means that I am always already aware of “I-me-myself” 
and have no need for self-observation or self-reflection to 
assure myself of being myself. Ipseity thus conveys the 
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very basic, persisting identity core, upon which more rich 
and complex feelings of identity and of being a person 
emerge and are created throughout our life.
The basic sense of minimal selfhood goes together 
with an automatic, unreflected immersion in the shared-
social world (variously called, eg, “common sense” 
[Blankenburg], “sense of reality” [Jaspers] or “fonction 
du réel” [Janet]). The world is always pregiven, ie, tacitly 
grasped as a self-evident background of all experiencing 
and meaning. One is not only self-present but also present 
in the midst of the world of which one is partaking. This 
tacit and foundational self-world structure manifests 
itself  as our ordinary “natural ontological attitude”: 
the world is pregiven as real, mind-independent, and 
constrained by the principles of space, time, causality, 
and noncontradiction, essentially making it reliable, 
predictable, and ontologically secure.
This basic self-world structure is disturbed in schizo-
phrenia spectrum disorders, ie, it is constantly challenged, 
unstable, and oscillating, resulting in alarming and alien-
ating anomalous self-experiences (also termed “self-disor-
ders”), typically occurring already in childhood or early 
adolescence.24 The patients feel ephemeral, lacking core 
identity, profoundly, yet often ineffably different from 
others (Anderssein) and alienated from the social world. 
There is a diminished sense of existing as a bodily subject, 
distortions of the first-person perspective with a failing 
sense of “mineness” of the field of awareness (eg, “it feels 
as if the thoughts aren’t really mine”), and a deficient sense 
of privacy of the inner world. There is a significant lack of 
attunement and immersion in the world, inadequate pre-
reflective grasp of self-evident meanings (perplexity), and 
hyper-reflectivity (eg, “I only live in my head” and “I always 
observe myself”). Although patients often suffer from self-
disorders, the latter are usually lived in an ego-syntonic 
way, as modes rather than as objects, of the patients’ expe-
rience, ie, often affecting more the “how” than the “what” 
of experience. What is important to emphasize at this 
point is that the self-disorders, reflecting the unstable basic 
self-world structure, destabilize the natural ontological 
attitude and may throw the patient into a new ontological-
existential perspective, an often solipsistic framework, no 
longer ruled by the “natural” certitudes concerning space, 
time, causality, and noncontradiction. Unconstrained by 
these certitudes, the world may appear as only apparent or 
staged, ontologically mind-dependent, prone to noncausal 
relations, and the patient may experience a unique access 
to deeper layers of reality, which are inaccessible to others. 
Often, these experiences evoke a specific sense of grandios-
ity, leaving others to be seen as oblivious to the true nature 
of reality and only concerned with everyday trivialities.
World Orientation in Schizophrenia
As described above, self-disorders entail a weakening of 
the natural attitude associated with the emergence of a 
solipsistic perspective, which usually culminates in psy-
chosis as a profound and rigid alteration of the sense of 
reality and existence: “[the] patients cannot take things 
to be the case in the usual way, as the [very] sense of ´is´ 
and ´is not´ has changed.”28 In our view, many psychotic 
patients adopt, what might be called, a double ontologi-
cal orientation, designated by Bleuler29 as “double book-
keeping,” which refers to the predicament (and ability) of 
simultaneously living in two different worlds, namely the 
shared-social world (ie, the natural ontological attitude) 
and a private, psychotic world (ie, a solipsistic ontologi-
cal attitude). The patients experience both worlds as rel-
evant and in that sense real. They also generally seem to 
experience them as two different, incommensurable, and 
thus not conflicting realities, thereby typically allowing 
them to coexist in an idiosyncratic-personal amalgam 
and, in the advanced/consolidated stages of the illness, 
only occasionally to collide (the beginning or exacer-
bation of psychosis may be, however, associated with a 
sense of perplexity). Daniel Paul Schreber30 describes in 
his memoirs a remarkable world of “nerves,” “rays,” and 
deities, providing us with an unusually lucid, first-person 
account of double bookkeeping. He claims that God has 
“entered into exclusive nerve-contact” with him by which 
he has “gained deeper insight than all other humans 
beings.” Schreber explains that this “nerve-contact” has 
made him the centre and constitutor of the world, whose 
existence now seems to depend entirely on him. Rather 
than confusing his psychotic experiences with those of 
real objects, Schreber seems for the most part to have 
been able to differentiate the two “worlds”: “I could 
even say with Jesus Christ: ‘My Kingdom is not of this 
world’; my so-called delusions are concerned solely with 
God and the beyond… The certainty of my knowledge 
of God and divine matters is so great and unshakeable 
that it is completely immaterial to me what other people 
think of the truth or probability of my ideas.”30 More 
recently, Professor Elyn Saks, the author of the book, 
The Center Cannot Hold: My Journey Through Madness, 
sketched the rationale behind her long-lasting denial of 
suffering from schizophrenia: “I completely recognized 
that the things I was saying and doing and feeling would 
be thought to amount to a diagnosis of schizophrenia; 
but I  thought that it was not true—I didn’t really have 
the illness… I  looked like I  had schizophrenia… but if 
we knew enough, we would see that I really did not… All 
of my so-called symptoms were things I simply chose to 
think or do. I  was choosing, eg, to hold certain beliefs 
even though the evidence was not what would classically 
constitute ‘good’ evidence—I had a special premium on 
the truth [italics added].”31 Saks seems here to say that she 
too experienced having a special access to or insight into 
the real nature of things, a deeper level of reality, which is 
not readily accessible to others. As Schneider concluded 
on the issue of delusional conviction: “the significance 
[of experience] is of a special kind; it always carries a 
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great import, is urgent and personal, a sign or message 
from another world.”32
Bleuler29 offers a vivid example of double bookkeeping: 
“A catatonic patient was in great fear of a hallucinated 
Judas Iscariot who was threatening her with a sword. She 
cried out that the Judas be driven away, but in between 
she begged for a piece of chocolate. Next day she 
complained about these hallucinations, apologized for 
her acts of violence; but in the middle of her complaints 
she expressed pleasure in a pretty belt. She managed to 
weave this belt into her delusions sufficiently to need 
reassurance that it was not a ‘Judas kiss’.” What is 
enigmatic in Bleuler’s vignette is that the patient’s behavior 
is strikingly at odds with her delusional beliefs. Normally, 
we would expect someone, who firmly believes that she is 
about to be slained, to defend herself  or seek cover; we 
would not expect her to ask for a piece of chocolate. For 
other illuminating examples of and reflections on double 
bookkeeping, see Sass.33,34 From a clinical perspective, 
double bookkeeping, although not always as spectacular 
as in Bleuler’s vignettes or Schreber’s memoirs, is a quite 
prevalent phenomenon, perhaps characterizing the 
majority of psychotic patients with schizophrenia.
It is important to reemphasize the difference between 
ordinarily held beliefs such as “there is an Italian restau-
rant around the corner” and delusional beliefs such as “I 
am the creator of the universe” or “others are automa-
tons.” The ordinarily held beliefs reflect the natural 
ontological attitude, which is an aspect of our automatic 
immersion in a shared-social world. These beliefs con-
cern matters of affairs in the public world, and if  con-
fronted with new or contrary information (eg, “I believe 
that it is in fact a Greek restaurant”), these beliefs are 
for the most part readily correctable. In contrast, delu-
sional beliefs in schizophrenia do typically not belong to 
the public sphere but rather to a solipsistic ontological 
attitude, facilitated and antedated by self-disorders, and 
these beliefs are rarely modifiable by counterarguments.35
Articulation of Psychosis
Most importantly, the formation of a schizophrenic delu-
sion, ie, what Jaspers and Schneider called a “primary” 
delusion, happens as a felt experience (Jaspers, Schneider, 
Conrad, and Blankenburg), and it is frequently announced 
by inkling irruptions of subthreshold psychotic experi-
ences, variously designated as predelusional, prodro-
mal, or micropsychotic (eg, “delusional atmosphere” or 
“abnormal awareness of significance”). A  crystallization 
of a primary delusion is not based on an inferential error 
about empirical matters in the public world but on the 
affection of and within the subjectivity itself by a revelation 
of delusional meaning, often carrying with it a sense of 
“absolute,” “apodictic” certainty, not completely unlike the 
certainty of experiencing a sensation (a so-called “egologi-
cal conviction,” like the certitude of having a toothache). 
A delusional (revelatory) experience has a partial, struc-
tural (formal) phenomenological analogy to certain aes-
thetic and mystic experiences. It may be described as an 
“epiphany,” a passive givenness or affection of another 
presence within the very intimacy of one’s own subjectivity 
or inner world. In their self-reports, mystics have described 
certain attitudes that facilitate the emergence of an epiph-
antic experience: a detachment from and disinterest toward 
reality and practical life, a suspension of ordinary onto-
logical assumptions, a spiritual solitude, and the attempts 
to efface or weaken one’s sense of self (dés-istement de soi-
même).36,37 Adopting these attitudes helps bringing forth a 
subjective state of receptive passivity in which the mysti-
cal experience may articulate itself. There is here a striking 
similarity (but certainly not identity) between the nature 
of these attitudes, deliberately adopted by a mystic, and 
the nature of the self-disorders that affect a person vulner-
able to schizophrenia. However, whereas the mystic will-
fully adopts (and, at least, partly controls) such attitudes to 
achieve his desired union with a deity, the person vulnera-
ble to schizophrenia is exposed to and involuntarily suffers 
from structurally similar phenomena, which we articulate 
as self-disorders.
Phenomenology of “Poor Insight”
In our view, patients with schizophrenia have poor insight 
into their illness and fail to comply with their treatment 
because of 3 interrelated aspects of the emergence of 
psychosis. First, the original delusional (or hallucinatory) 
experience is an essentially lived, pathic (felt) event within 
the patient’s own subjectivity, thus presenting a quality of 
an irrefutable subjective (egological) reality. One of our 
patients with residual schizophrenia and on continuous 
antipsychotic depot medication participated in a 
psychiatric training interview, years after her psychosis 
had remitted. When asked, after the completed interview, 
why, at the very illness onset, her telephone was bugged, 
she answered: “This question I  continue to ask my self  
to this day!” Here, the original feeling of having been 
tapped retained, in the patient’s memory, a status of the 
experience’s irrefutable subjective reality. In other words, 
she could doubt the objective reality of her fully formed 
delusions but not her original feeling of “being listened 
to” (which is most likely the primary delusional experience 
that she thematized as being “bugged”). Second, the 
full articulation of psychosis amplifies and congeals 
the solipsistic ontological attitude at the expense of the 
natural ontological attitude. Third, this transformation 
does not happen abruptly or ex nihilo: The patients often 
do not experience their initial self-disorders, from which 
psychosis emerges, as “symptoms” of an illness (similar 
to how an intense abdominal pain might be a symptom of 
appendicitis) but rather as intrinsic and habitual aspects 
of their existence and identity. For example, first-admitted 
schizophrenia patients, who report hearing their own 
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thoughts spoken aloud “internally” (Gedankenlautwerden), 
may get surprised and even suspicious, when the clinician 
explains that most people only have “silent” thoughts. In 
our experience, this is characteristic of many self-disorders. 
When interviewing patients about their self-disorders, 
one quickly realizes that many of their anomalous self-
experiences have been present for as long as the patients 
can remember or at least for so long that they have become 
inconspicuously interwoven into the patients’ mode of 
experiencing. Self-disorders are mainly trait-like features, 
preceding the onset of psychosis and persisting after 
remission. It is, therefore, a radically different situation 
than, say, in the case of a single depressive episode where 
the patient has a distinct sense of whom she was and how 
her life used to be before the depression set in and after. 
In schizophrenia, this is not the case to the same extent, 
given that the altered experiential framework and the 
solipsistic ontological attitude, inherent in self-disorders, 
for years have been the rule (or “norm”) rather than the 
exception, making the “onset dating” not only a technical 
but also a conceptual issue.38 We may therefore also speak 
of a prepsychotic double bookkeeping. One of our patients, 
during his prepsychotic high school years, felt a pervasively 
diminished sense of presence, quasi-solipsistic experiences, 
and a related, nonpsychotic grandiosity, while remaining 
inconspicuously adapted to the shared-social world. He 
thought of others as “souls” that had fallen on earth from 
an encompassing “world soul” (to which we all return 
after death), like raindrops from a cloud. He accounted 
for his own unique abilities and feelings of “Anderssein” 
by thinking that he perhaps retained a sort of “capillary” 
continuity with the “world soul” and thereby had access 
to the far deeper reality levels than his fellow humans 
were able to achieve. An articulation of such an explicit, 
quasi-religious, metaphysical position is, of course, not a 
common clinical event, but this example illustrates well 
the solipsistic transformation of the patient’s experiential-
ontological framework. Many young, preonset patients 
try to account for their sense of “Anderssein” by fantasies 
of being time-travelers, extraterrestrials, etc. From the 
perspective of prepsychotic double bookkeeping, we can 
understand that patients may find the distinction fuzzy 
between, on the one side, their “normal” (ie, anomalous) 
experiences (eg, anonymity of thoughts and nonpsychotic 
demarcation and identity problems) and, on the other 
side, the occasional believing that others can access their 
thoughts or that certain thoughts have been planted into 
their mind. In other words, the line between what a patient 
habitually experiences and what he sometimes experiences 
(eg, delusions) may seem slim and perhaps irrelevant to the 
patient. From this perspective, it makes sense that many 
schizophrenia patients do not feel ill or do not attribute 
their abnormal experiences to a mental disorder. In short, 
we propose that the reason why patients with schizophrenia 
have no or only partial insight and consequently do not 
comply with treatment is rooted in the nature of their 
self-disorders and their related schizophrenic psychosis. 
In contrast to the predominant accounts, we suggest 
that poor insight in schizophrenia is not primarily an 
“erroneous” appropriation of certain experiential contents 
(eg, “my belief that I’m the creator of the universe is true 
and thus not a delusion”) but intimately connected to 
specific alterations of the structures of experiencing (ie, 
self-disorders), prefiguring the emergence and nature of 
the schizophrenic psychosis.
Conclusion
The notion of  disordered self  as the core disturbance 
in schizophrenia is as old as the schizophrenia con-
cept itself24 and is consistent with recent empirical 
studies.18–23 Our account of  poor insight derives from 
these studies, clinical experience, and considerations 
framed by a phenomenological approach to psychia-
try.39 Our account needs, of  course, a more systematic 
support from empirical research. Potentially, however, 
it may have important implications for early interven-
tion and treatment: psychoeducational attempts to 
increase insight and optimize compliance may prove 
more successful if  they strive to raise an awareness of 
the underlying, disposing vulnerability features (ie, self-
disorders). Psychotherapeutic approaches may adopt 
a similar strategy and, instead of  trying to correct the 
patients’ “errors of  judgment” (delusions and hallu-
cination), explore the patients’ inherent vulnerability 
and their psychotic experiences as potentially relevant 
sources of  meaning for the patients.
An important aspect of the altered experiential frame-
work and the implied weakening of the natural ontologi-
cal attitude is the emergence of a solipsistic ontological 
attitude, which may manifest itself  in feelings of having 
extraordinary insight into dimensions of reality that 
usually remain hidden from others. This loosening of 
“common sense” constraints may constitute a phenom-
enological dimension of the epidemiological association 
between vulnerability to schizophrenia and creativity.40
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